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The liberalisation of trade and investment policies' improvements in
information technology, communications and transportation has resulted in
a dramatic increase in global commerce and global competition. To obtain
access to new markets and compete globally, firms are entering into global
mergers and global alliances.
In terms of competition, global mergers can be anti-competitive, pro-
competitive. or neutral. The competition concerns raised by global mergers
are the same as those raised by domestic mergers. Global mergers are anti-
competitive if they increase unilateral market power. which the merged firm
can exploit by raising prices. They can result in a reduction in the number
of major market participants, thereby increasing the scope for coordination
through international cartels.
In the past, tariff and non-tariff barriers may have effectively insulated
domestic producers from import competition. However, as these barriers
have been removed and international trade has grown, domestic producers
have been increasingly confronted with competition from imports. Entering
into a global merger is one way to eliminate import competition. This kind
of merger may be considered anti-competitive.
On the other hand, global mergers can have pro-competitive effects
when they introduce vigorous new competition into domestic markets
where local potential competitors have faced high barriers to entry in those
markets.
* Professor of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Consultant, Phillips Fox,
Lawyers. This article is based on a paper presented at a conference organised by the Insti-
tute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, on September 30, 1999.
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Competition regulators ensure anti-competitive mergers challenged
and pro-competitive or neutral mergers proceed unchallenged.
Australia's competition regulator, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission ("ACCC"), recognises the trend towards global
mergers in its 1999 Merger Guidelines. It states:
Increasingly the Commission must deal with acquisitions in a global
context. This may involve consideration of global competition, or even global
markets, and the role of mergers in enhancing efficiency and international
competitiveness.... In addition, the mergers themselves may occur on a global
scale, often involving multinational companies. Where these mergers impact
on a market in Australia they will generally be subject to the Act.... Firms in-
volved in these mergers will often have to deal with multiple competition
agencies around the world. The Commission is increasingly involved in dis-
course and cooperation with these agencies and the OECD Committee on
Competition Law and Policy recently approved a report reviewing and synthe-
sising member countries' merger notification practices into a 'Framework for a
Notification and Report Form for Concentrations'.1
The purpose of this article is to examine some recent global mergers
from an Australian perspective. The article begins by considering the ad-
ministrative tribunal and Court structure in Australia, as well as the proce-
dural, substantive. and remedial aspects of Australian laws regulating global
mergers.2 It then considers the Merger Guidelines and their focus on the
unilateral and co-ordinated post-merger effects that are likely to occur. The
article examines a number of recent global mergers. including Coopers &
Lybrand/Price Waterhouse, BAT/Rothmans, Pepsi Co/Smith's Snack Foods
and Coca-Cola/Cadbury Schweppes, as well as their assessment by the
ACCC. Finally, it considers some of the problems posed by multiple
merger review by competition agencies around the world.
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND COURT STRUCTURE IN AUSTRALIA
Australia's competition law is contained in the Trade Practices Act of
1974 (amended 1986) ("the Act"). Part IV of the Act is headed "Restrictive
Trade Practices."3 It contains a number of prohibitions that have the objec-
tive of promoting effective competition. Sections 50 and 50A prohibit
mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition.
'Merger Guidelines, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 3.11 (Can-
berra June 1999) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].2Very little has been written on the special problems posed by global mergers in Austra-
lia. The Chairman of the ACCC, Professor Allan Fels, set out his views in a helpful but brief
paper, Global Mergers - ACCC Approach, 20 AusTL. COMP. & CONSUMER COMM'N. J. 1
(1999). See also Rhonda L. Smith, Globalisation: What Does It Mean For Competition
Policy? in 25 YEARS OF AUSTRALLAN COMPETTION LAW 166 (Steinwall ed., Butterworths,
Sydney, 2000).
3For a doctrinal analysis, see S.G. Corones, COMPeLTiON LAW IN AusTRALiA (LBC In-
formation Services, Sydney, 1999).
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Australia has adopted a dual adjudication system with two tiers of
regulation in relation to mergers. The first tier provides for regulation by
the Courts. Jurisdiction has been conferred on the Federal Court of Austra-
lia to hear and determine whether a breach of section 50 has occurred. The
ACCC, an administrative agency, is responsible for enforcing section 50 of
the Act by initiating Court proceedings for an injunction to prevent a
merger or for divestiture in the case of an anti-competitive merger that has
been completed.4
The second tier provides for regulation by the ACCC. While the courts
are responsible for deciding whether there has been a contravention of sec-
tion 50, the ACCC has an adjudicative role to play in assessing applications
for authorisation where a merger would be likely to result in a public bene-
fit that outweighs any anti-competitive detriment. The ACCC considers
these authorisations exemptions from the Act, conferring immunity from
legal proceedings.
The Australian Competition Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body, hears ap-
peals from determinations made by the ACCC. Its President is a Federal
Court Judge who determines questions of law, while the other members of
the Tribunal are expert economists and business people.
m. PROCEDURAL, SUBSTANTIVE AND REMEDIAL ASPECTS OF GLOBAL
MERGERS
The Act has no mandatory requirement for parties proposing an acqui-
sition to notify the ACCC in advance to seek a clearance.
Delay and uncertainty can prove fatal to a proposed merger. Where
there is a risk a proposed merger may lessen competition, the parties gener-
ally notify the ACCC in advance. The ACCC requires adequate time to
make market inquiries and expects to be given the same notice and relevant
documentation as overseas competition authorities. In its 1999 Merger
Guidelines, the ACCC states that parties should advise the Commission of
their plans at least three or four weeks before entering into an agreement.6
In a Discussion Paper entitled "ACCC Merger Assessment Informal
Notification and Timing Issues" (December 1999) the Commission divides
mergers into two broad categories: less complex mergers and more complex
mergers. Less complex mergers are those that do not breach the ACCC's
concentration thresholds set out in the Merger Guidelines discussed below.
4Section 80 provides for the grant of injunctions. Section 81 provides for divestiture or-
ders. Trade Practices Act of 1974, §§ 80-81 (as amended in 1986). The Trade Practices
(Transfer of Market Dominance) Act of 1986 and the Trade Practices Revision Act of 1986
amended the original Trade Practices Act of 1974. The resulting statute is now commonly
referred to as the Trade Practices Act of 1974 (as amended in 1986). References to "the
Act" throughout the remainder of this article are to the Act as amended in 1986.
5Trade Practices Act, supra note 4, at Part VII.6Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, para. 4.13.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:255 (2000)
In relation to less complex mergers the ACCC will generally provide a
response within ten to fifteen days. The written submission .should contain
the following information: (1) background information about the parties;
the structure of the market, including any relevant information about other
major market participants; (2) the commercial rationale for the merger; and
(3) analysis of the proposed acquisition in terms of the factors referred to in
section 50(3) of the Act.
In relation to more complex mergers that cross the concentration
thresholds, the ACCC will require about a month to conduct a more detailed
inquiry. A small number of major transactions that raise substantial issues
may take six to eight weeks to consider. In relation to these more complex
mergers the ACCC will require the following additional information: all
marketing plans, business plans and strategic plans made available to senior
management concerning the transaction or related transactions; all Board
minutes and reports considered by the Board relating to the transaction and
any reports/studies relating to the transaction presented to the Board; de-
tailed customers and suppliers information as requested; and any financial
data information as requested.
The ACCC states that offshore acquisitions and global mergers gener-
ally require "more time" for the relevant information to be assessed and for
the Commission to liaise with overseas competition regulators.
If the ACCC forms the view that the proposed acquisition is unlikely to
substantially lessen competition the parties can proceed. If the ACCC
forms the view that the proposed merger is likely to lessen competition the
acquirer will be required to divest sufficient assets pursuant to a sec-
tion 87B undertaking to ensure that the merger does not have anti-
competitive effects in Australia. These section 87B undertakings are in the
nature of consent injunctions and if the parties were to breach them, the
Court could make an order directing the parties to comply without the need
for a full trial.
If the parties to a proposed merger are unable to re-structure the ar-
rangement to avoid a breach, they have no choice but to apply to the ACCC
for an authorisation. The ACCC is empowered by section 88(9) of the Act
to grant an authorisation to a person to acquire shares or assets or to acquire
a controlling interest in a body corporate that would otherwise be contrary
to section 50 or section 50A. The test to be applied is set out in sec-
tion 90(9), namely that it must be satisfied in all the circumstances that the
proposed acquisition would result, or be likely to result, in such a benefit to
the public that the acquisition should be allowed to take place.
The main focus of section 50 is on domestic mergers but it also applies
to global mergers. Section 50 must be considered in the context of sec-
tion 5(1) which extends its operation. Section 5(1) provides: "Part IV [in
which section 50 appears].. .extend[s] to the engaging in conduct outside
Australia by bodies corporate incorporated or carrying on business within
Australia...."
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The ACCC takes the view that the acquisition occurs where the prop-
erty is situated rather than where the agreement is signed or the shares are
acquired.7 Thus, for example, in TPC v. Australia Meat Holdings Pty. Ltd.8
an Australian incorporated company, Australia Meat Holdings Pty. Ltd.,
acquired the issued capital of Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australia) Ltd.
from two United Kingdom companies which were in turn, owned by
Borthwicks Plc., another United Kingdom company. The acquisition of
share capital occurred in London. Even so, the merger was prohibited by
section 50.
The Commission relied on section 50 when it reviewed the Gillette
Company's acquisition of the Wilkinson Sword Ltd. 'wet shaving' busi-
ness, a transaction initiated by entities outside Australia and occurring
wholly outside Australia.9
Section 50 does not extend to prohibit mergers between purely foreign
companies operating outside Australia which result in domestic subsidiaries
coming under the common control of the merged foreign parent. A separate
section, section 50A, was introduced into the Act to deal with this situation.
Section 50A adopts the same threshold test as section 50, namely whether
the merger is likely to lessen competition substantially in an Australian
market. However, a different set of procedures and remedies is provided
for in section 50A.
Section 50A prohibits certain acquisitions occurring outside Australia
that have anti-competitive effects within Australia. The elements of a sec-
tion 50A(l) claim are: an acquisition occurring outside Australia (the first
controlling interest); results in the acquiring person obtaining a controlling
interest in a corporation in Australia (the second controlling interest); the
Tribunal is satisfied that the obtaining of the second controlling interest will
have or be likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in
a market in Australia; and the Tribunal is satisfied that the obtaining of the
second controlling interest would not result in sufficient public benefit that
it ought to be disregarded.
In effect, section 50A(1) provides that the Tribunal may make a decla-
ration that if the Australian operations of the parties had formally merged
7Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, para 3.12.
8TPC v. Australia Meat Holdings Pty. Ltd., 83 A.L.R. 299 (1988).
9See A. I. Tonking, The Gillette Case -A Close Shave, 3 CoMPETrrION & CONSUMER L.
J. 62, 80 (stating "The Commission's argument was that the worldwide agreement purported
to affect the right or title to assets of the Wilkinson Sword business situated in Australia by
conferring upon Gillette a proprietary interest in those assets. Australian law, it was con-
tended, as the lex situs of those assets determined whether, and the extent to which, such an
interest was effectively vested in Gillette in consequence of the agreement. The interest
arose under Australian law, which was the source of the relevant property rights; it arose in
Australia and therefore could be said to have been acquired in Australia.").
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there would have been a contravention of section 50(1) or (2) and that the
bidder would not have been able to obtain an authorisation.
A person shall be taken to have a controlling interest in a body corpo-
rate if the body corporate is or would be a subsidiary of the person.' 0 A
subsidiary for the purposes of section 50A is defined in section 4A which
provides that a corporation will be a subsidiary if another body corporate
controls the composition of its board of directors; is in a position to cast
more than fifty percent of the maximum number of votes that can be cast at
a general meeting; or holds more than fifty percent of the issued share
capital.
If the Tribunal makes a declaration, as outlined above, then sec-
tion 50A seeks to ensure that the market power acquired as a result of the
acquisition outside Australia is dissipated until the merged entity no longer
substantially lessens competition. This can be achieved by means of a par-
tial or full voluntary divestiture. Following a partial divestiture it would be
necessary to apply to the Tribunal pursuant to section 50A(4) seeking a
revocation of the declaration made under section 50A(1).
Section 50A does not prohibit the merger of foreign parents. Rather,
the procedures and remedies are directed at the Australian subsidiaries.
Section 50A provides for declarations to be made by the Australian Com-
petition Tribunal that the merger substantially lessens competition and does
not give rise to an overriding public benefit. If a declaration is made, the
domestic subsidiary corporations have six months to cease operations or to
divest themselves of sufficient assets to avoid the anti-competitive effect of
the merger.
This may be commercially unattractive given the short time frame left
to find an acceptable purchaser. If the entity continues to carry on business
beyond the six-month period without having the declaration revoked, the
entity would contravene section 50A(6). In that event, the ACCC could
seek divestiture under section 81(lB) ordering the disposal of such assets
within a specified period of time.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL LESSENING OF COMPETITION: UNILATERAL EFFECTS
AND Co-ORDINATED EFFECTS
In January 1993 the standard applied in the threshold test in section 50
was changed from 'dominance' to 'substantially lessening competition' by
the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 1992 ("1992 Amendment
Act").
The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the 1992 Amendment
Act stated:
The previous test of market dominance has been interpreted by the court
as a situation where one finm has a commanding influence in the market. It is a
10Trade Practices Act, supra note 5, at § 50A(8)(a).
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test which focuses largely on changes to the structure of a market that would
be affected by the acquisition but it also takes some account of the likely effect
on the competitive process of such an acquisition. The substantial lessening
test focuses on changes to the state of competition in the relevant market. As
the Trade Practices Act is about competition, a test which concentrates on
competition and whether there is a lessening of that competition is more con-
sistent with the policy underlying the legislation.
The term 'substantially lessening competition' is used widely through the
Principal Act. It is here intended to mean an effect on competition which is
real or of substance, not one which must be large or weighty. While in many
cases, a merger or acquisition would be caught by either the 'dominance' or
the 'substantial lessening' test, there are some acquisitions that are more likely
to be subject to the new test, for example, where an acquisition of a small ef-
fective competitor results in two well-matched competitors being left in the
market."
Unlike the dominance threshold which is only concerned with the po-
sition of the acquirer in the market and the unilateral effects of the merger
in terms of the ability of the merged entity to raise price above competitive
levels, the substantial lessening of competition test is concerned with uni-
lateral effects and the likelihood that the firms remaining in a market after a
merger will engage in explicit or tacit collusion. Both the unilateral and the
coordinated effects of the merger must be considered. In relation to the co-
ordinated effects, the parties to a proposed merger must rebut the inference
that the removal of a competitor as a result of the merger will inevitably
lead to collusion.
The Act lists a number of matters that must be taken into account by
the Court in determining the anti-competitive effect of a merger. It pro-
vides:
Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account for the pur-
poses of subsections (1) and (2) in determining whether the acquisition would
have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening com-
petition in a market, the following matters must be taken into account:
" the actual and potential level of import competition in the market;
" the height of barriers to entry to the market;
" the level of concentration in the market;
" the degree of countervailing power in the market;
" the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the acquirer being
able to significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins;
- the extent to which substitutes are available in the market or are
likely to be available in the market;
- the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, inno-
vation and product differentiation;
"Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill 1992, paras.
1I, 12.
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" the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the removal from
" the market of a vigorous and effective competitor;
" the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market.
The list of factors in section 50(3) is not exclusive. The Court and the
ACCC will take into account other matters that may affect the likely com-
petitive outcome of the merger. The focus on co-ordinated effects as well
as unilateral effects is expressed in the Merger Guidelines:
5.167 One factor which is of general relevance is the extent to which the
market is characterised by conditions conducive to coordinated conduct.
While the exercise of unilateral market power does not require accommodating
action by remaining firms in a market, the exercise of coordinated market
power does. This does not necessarily involve collusion of the kind covered
by § 45 but may simply involve signaling or conscious parallelism. Features
of the market which impinge on the likely rewards from coordination, the like-
lihood of reaching an agreement, and the ability of the parties to detect and
punish deviations from the agreement, are all relevant to the likelihood of such
conduct occurring and being successful in the future.
5.168 Some of the factors affecting the likelihood of coordinated conduct
are:
. a small number of firms increases the likelihood that firms will
recognise mutual benefits from cooperation, and makes it easier to
reach an agreement and detect cheating;
- the absence of potential entrants or fringe competitors makes it
less likely that coordinated conduct will be undermined;
- inelastic demand increases firms' returns from coordination ver-
sns competition;
- product homogeneity makes it easier to reach an agreement and
easier to detect deviations;
- firm homogeneity, similarity of cost and other conditions, e.g.
vertical integration, product lines, or production capacity, affecting
the interests of rivals makes it easier to reach an agreement;
- posted prices or open bids, i.e. transparency of prices, make
monitoring an agreement easier;
- vertical relationships may enable price signalling [sic] or price
monitoring downstream;
- size and frequency of purchases affects firms' incentives to coop-
erate or compete; and
- industry associations and for a may facilitate the flow of infor-
mation on prices and outputs between market participants and/or
may facilitate them reaching an agreement.
5.169 If a merger increases the likelihood of coordination it is likely to
substantially lessen competition. Both horizontal and vertical mergers may
have this effect. For example, mergers can increase the level of concentration
in a market, they may remove a maverick competitor which has destabilised
past attempts at market coordination, they may create rivals with a greater
commonality of interest, or they may increase the visibility of pricing through
downstream integration. In other circumstances a merger which disrupts mar-
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ket conditions, e.g. by reducing the costs of the merged firm or eliminating a
technology disadvantage, may disturb the terms of coordination and may make
such coordination less likely.
5.170 When considering the likelihood of future coordination the Com-
mission will also consider any existing relationships between firms and the
past history of market conduct, whether it has been characterised by price fix-
ing, parallel pricing or vigorous price competition and how such conduct is
likely to be affected by the merger.
12
The Merger Guidelines do not make clear when the Commission will
rely on unilateral effects, or co-ordinated effects, or both, to oppose a
merger. In Ampol/Caltex, for example, Caltex Australia Ltd. and Ampol
Ltd. announced a merger of their Australian petroleum operations. The
Commission initially opposed the merger since it would have resulted in a
reduction in the number of major refining and marketing companies in the
petroleum industry from five to four. The four firm concentration ratio
would be 100 percent and the merged firm would be the largest supplier
well in excess of the threshold of fifteen percent. Import competition was
not an effective competitive constraint and barriers to entry were substan-
tial. There were considerable sunk costs involved in the construction of a
petroleum refinery and economies of scale were also considerable. In rela-
tion to other structural and behavioural market features there was extensive
vertical integration and close vertical relationships through retail distribu-
tion arrangements. There was little countervailing power from buyers.
The Commission was concerned about the potential exercise of unilat-
eral market power because of the homogeneous nature of the product and
the likelihood that the reduction in the number of refiners from five to four
would facilitate the exercise of co-ordinated market power.1
3
By way of contrast, in Wattyl/Courtaulds,14 the Commission empha-
sised the potential exercise of coordinated market power rather than unilat-
eral market power.
The parties applied for an authorisation rather than risk the Commis-
sion challenging the merger in the courts. The Commission gave the fol-
lowing reasons for refusing the application:
6.249 However, there are strong reasons for doubting that.. .competition
would exist following the merger. The more likely outcome is that the two
major firms would cooperate rather than compete. This would be to the detri-
ment of competition and efficiency. The probability of cooperation emerging
rather than competition is substantial given the structural features of the archi-
tectural and decorative paint market.
1
2Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, at paras. 5.167-5.170.
1
3 See Jill Walker and Luke Woodward, The Ampol/Caltex Australia Merger: Trade
Practices Issues, 4 TRADE PRAC. L. J. 21, 21 (1996).
14A.T.P.R. (CCH) 50-232 (1996). See Smith, Issues Raised by the Proposed Acquisition
of Taubmanns by Wattyl (1996) 9 CoRP. & Bus. L. J. 223.
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6.250 In reaching this conclusion, the Commission has considered the
factors that are conducive to the exercise of both unilateral and coordinated
market power. One such factor is a reduction in the number of firms in the
market. This raises the likelihood that remaining firms will engage in coop-
erative behaviour because it is easier to reach and monitor agreements (both
explicit and tacit). In this matter, the number of substantial effective competi-
tors falls from three to two...
6.252 Coordination is also facilitated if firms have similar cost structures
as each firm has a similar view as to the appropriate price... The net effect is
that cost structures between Taubmanns/Wattyl and Dulux are likely to be
similar.
6.253 Furthermore, if there are few close substitutes, such that the price
elasticity of demand is low, it is easier for firms to maintain price near monop-
oly levels. There are no close substitutes for paint...
6.255 Cooperative behaviour is easier to sustain if there is an even flow
of frequent and small sized sales because the potential pay-off from undercut-
ting a rival is smaller than if sales are in large lots and occur infrequently. This
condition is generally satisfied in this case. 
5
The Commission was primarily concerned with the potential exercise
of unilateral market power in Bristile Holdings Ltd.16 Bristile Holdings Ltd.
('Bristile") lodged an application for authorisation to acquire the Western
Australian concrete tile assets of Pioneer Building Products ("PRT") Pty.
Ltd. ("Pioneer"). Bristile was the only manufacturer of clay roof tiles in
Western Australia. In the Commission's view, the relevant product market
was the market for clay and concrete roof tiles. The other suppliers in the
market, apart from Bristile and Pioneer, were Monier ("CSR") and Har-
mony Tiles produced by the Buckeridge Group ("BGC"). The Commission
was concerned that the merged entity would be in a position to exercise
unilateral power by raising prices and disciplining its competitors if they re-
fused to follow:
5.87 The Commission's concerns with the proposed acquisition derive
from two key consequences resulting from the acquisition. First, Bristile will
be able to exert a considerable degree of control over both clay and concrete
tile prices in the market...
5.89 Second, Bristile will derive economies of scope from the transaction
by sharing overheads between its concrete and clay tile business[es]. These
savings will commit Bristile to pursue concrete tile prices that cannot be sus-
tained by either BGC or Monier in the long run. Given the tight financial po-
sition of both BGC and Monier, Bristile might take the view that it can force
its competitors from the market by lowering concrete tile prices for a period
and supporting itself with profits from its clay tile business. Such an approach
by Bristile would be encouraged by the presence of ongoing substantial excess
capacity in the industry and the perception that some form of capacity ration-
alisation may be inevitable.
'-A.T.P.R. (CCH) 56-637-38 (1996).
16A.T.P.R. (CCH) 50-250 (1997).
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5.90 Alternatively, Bristile's ability to drive concrete tile prices down
presents a credible threat to the concrete tile manufacturers if Bristile attempts
to lead prices up but does not receive the 'cooperation' of BGC and Monier.
It seems that the ACCC's primary concern where products are differ-
entiated lies with unilateral effects and whether the merger would lead to
higher prices for the products sold by the merged firms. Even though two
products may be in the same market, a corporation with a differentiated
product, nevertheless, may have scope for exploiting unilateral market
power by raising price. On the other hand, where the products at issue are
homogeneous, such as petroleum or other commodities, the ACCC is more
likely to be concerned with the potential for coordinated conduct arising
post-merger.
V. THE ACCC's MERGER REVIEW PROCESS
At the administrative level the ACCC, in deciding whether to challenge
a proposed merger, adopts a five-stage process of review which incorpo-
rates the section 50(3) factors. The review process is summarised by the
ACCC:
1. The Commission identifies the relevant market; in its relevant product,
geographic, functional and temporal dimensions.
2. The Commission assesses the level of concentration in the market of
the merged firm in order to determine whether the merger falls below certain
thresholds.... If the threshold is exceeded the Commission proceeds to its next
stage of evaluation.
3. The Commission assesses the actual and potential level of import
competition in the market to determine whether it provides an effective con-
straint on the merged entity.
4. The Commission assesses barriers to entry to determine whether it is
likely that new entrants will establish themselves in the market on a sufficient
scale within a reasonable time to inhibit the exercise of market power by the
merging firm.
5. If the acquisition is still under consideration the Commission will ex-
amine a series of other factors including:
- the degree of countervailing power in the market;
- the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the acquirer being
able to significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins;
- the extent to which substitutes are, or are likely to be, available in the
market;
• the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innova-
tion and product differentiation;
- the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the removal from the
market of a vigorous and effective competitor; and
- the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market. 8
171d. at 57-307-08.
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A. Stage 1: Market Definition
Where the conduct at issue is an alleged anti-competitive merger, one
needs to consider the purpose of section 50, which is to prevent the merged
entity from exercising market power after the merger by raising its price to
the detriment of consumers. Thus, in defining the market one needs to ask
whether a post-merger price rise would be profitable or whether the merged
entity would lose sales as a result of consumers switching to other products.
If such demand substitution is likely, those other products will be included
in the relevant market.
In testing demand-side substitutability, the ACCC commences with the
product that is the subject of the merger and considers the effect on demand
of a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (hereinafter
"SSNIP") by a hypothetical monopolist supplier of the product. The 1992
U.S. Department of Justice Merger GuidelinesW usually adopt a five per-
cent increase in price, in applying the SSNIP or hypothetical monopolist
test.
Applying this test to the Coca-Cola/Cadbury Schweppes merger, the
question becomes: Is Coca-Cola constrained in its price-increasing ability
by other beverages? If so, they should be included in the same market.
Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow have identified the fundamental prob-
lem:
The obvious problem lies in the varying degrees of constraint. The most
immediate constraints on the prices of regular Coca-Cola are the prices of
other widely advertised colas. These prices in turn are constrained by the
prices of widely advertised cola beverages without sugar or without caffeine,
by similar private brand products, by some other flavoured and highly pro-
moted sodas, and by soda beverages generally. These prices may even be af-
fected by the prices of other beverages such as fruit juice, milk, wine, beer, and
perhaps even gin or cognac.20
The process of product definition is a fact of intensive inquiry involv-
ing value judgements about which there are frequently differences of opin-
ion. For example, in the Coca-Cola/Cadbury Schweppes merger, Coca-
Cola's various brands (Coke, Fanta, Sprite and others) accounted for 51
percent of global carbonated soft drink sales. The parties to the merger ar-
gued that the relevant product market should include all beverages includ-
ing tap water and that its share of the market is only two percent.2'
"8 Exports and the Trade Practices Act, AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N J.,
Oct., 1997, at 12-13. For a fuller discussion, see Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, at paras.
5.23 to 5.33.
"9See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (1992), reprinted in 4 TRADEREG. REP. (CCH) 13, 104.
20 AREEDA, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW, para. 533 (Little Brown Vol. I IA 1995).21Software, Soft Drinks, THE EcONOMIsT, Aug. 14, 1999, at 14.
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Such an approach to product market definition was rejected by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in FTC v Coca-
Cola Co.22 Proceedings were brought by the Federal Trade Commission for
an interlocutory injunction to enjoin Coca-Cola from acquiring Dr. Pepper
pending FTC hearings to determine whether the acquisition violated sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits acquisitions that may substan-
tially lessen competition in any line of commerce. The Court was
persuaded that the appropriate "line of commerce" for measuring the prob-
able effects of the acquisition was the carbonated soft drink market. It con-
cluded:
In view of the structure and operation of this industry, the relevant line of
commerce in evaluating the acquisition is assuredly not what Coca-Cola Com-
pany suggests -- "all.. .beverages including tap water" -- even though it is true
that other beverages quench thirst and that "It]he human stomach can consume
only a finite amount of liquid in any given period of time." The market or
submarkets delineated need not be this broad (anything potable) nor as unduly
narrow (concentrate flavoring) as lawyers or economists may choose to sug-
gest.
Moreover, the major participants in the market do a nationwide business
and specialize mainly in carbonated soft drinks. They make pricing and mar-
keting decisions based primarily on comparisons with rival carbonated soft
drink products, with little if any concern about possible competition from other
beverages such as milk, coffee, beer or fruit juice.23
The ACCC in the Coca-Cola and Cadbury Schweppes merger reached
the same conclusion and defined the relevant product market as carbonated
soft drinks.
The ACCC has indicated that it will have regard to the following in-
formation in establishing the relevant product dimension of the market:
(1) end use of the product and potential substitutes; (2) physical and tech-
nical characteristics of the product and potential substitutes; (3) costs of
switching purchases between the product and potential substitutes; (4) views
and past behaviour of buyers regarding the likelihood of substitution between
products; (5) costs of switching production and distribution systems from an-
other product line to a product which is closely substitutable with the relevant
product; (6) views, business records and past behaviour of suppliers regarding
the impact of price and marketing decisions by the suppliers of potential sub-
stitute products on their own pricing and marketing decisions; and (7) relative
price levels and price movements of the product compared to potential substi-
tutes.
24
Geographic market definition poses particular problems in relation to
global mergers. In Australia the geographic market is defined using the
same price elevation relied upon for product market definition. The test re-
22Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986).
231d. at 1133.24Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, at para. 5.59.
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quires one to infer what the response would be if a supplier in one location,
for example, in Sydney, raised its price. If, because of the supplier's geo-
graphic isolation, there would be no response from suppliers in other geo-
graphic locations, then the Sydney supplier occupies a separate geographic
market. If, on the other hand, the Sydney supplier is constrained in its price
setting by suppliers in other parts of Australia or Southeast Asia, then the
market is broader than the Sydney market.
In relation to global mergers, it is necessary to take account of possible
changes in transport costs and exchange rates. A devaluation of the Aus-
tralian dollar will make imports expensive and discourage foreign suppliers
from selling in Australia. Market shares for imports may be overstated. A
strengthening of the Australian dollar will allow foreign suppliers to sell at
prices below the domestic prices and imports will increase.
The extent to which imports should be taken into account in competi-
tion analysis has been the subject of much debate. 25 The debate was trig-
gered by an influential article by Landes and Posner,26 who argued that
traditional market definition was unsatisfactory because it resulted in exag-
gerated market shares. They concluded that all of the actual or potential
output of foreign sellers, should be included in the relevant market where
non-trivial imports are present, regardless of transport costs. 27 Their ap-
proach focused on diversion and they argued in favour of including all im-
ports in such circumstances "because the distant seller has proved its ability
to sell in the market and could increase its sales there, should the local price
rise, simply by diverting sales from other markets."2 8 The application of
such an approach might reduce the market share of the local seller to a point
where the relevant statutory competition test may not apply.
The Commission states in its 1999 Merger Guidelines:
Section 4E defines a market to be a market "in Australia", while § 50(6)
defines a market to be a market "in Australia, in a State or in a Territory". Ar-
guably, the Act does not require that the relevant market be defined as wholly
within Australia, only that at least some part of it be in Australia. For practical
purposes, there will generally be significant discontinuities in substitution be-
tween domestic and imported supply. In most cases the Commission will de-
fine the relevant market to be Australia or a part of Australia (but including
imports). However, in some circumstances it may be relevant to define the
market as broader than Australia, eg trans-Tasman, or even a world market.29
It will have regard to the following types of information:
2SSee, e.g., Richard Calvini, The Uncertainties of International Geographic Markets 32
WORLD CoMe. 93 (1998).26William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HAv.
L. RFv. 937 (1981).
27 Id. at 966.
28 Id. at 963.
29 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, at para. 5.63.
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(1) the convenience to customers of accessing alternative sources of sup-
ply; (2) the costs of switching to alternative sources of supply; (3) views and
past behaviour of buyers regarding the likelihood of switching between geo-
graphic sources of supply; (4) the costs of transportation or access to the alter-
native sources of supply; (5) the perishability of the product; (6) any regulatory
or other practical constraints on suppliers selling to the customers of the
merging firms; (7) the costs of extending or switching production and distribu-
tion systems to supply the customers of the merging firms; (8) views, business
records and past behaviour of suppliers regarding the impact of price and mar-
keting decisions in one geographic area on supply from another geographic
area; and (9) the relative Brice levels and price movements of different geo-
graphic sources of supply.
B. Stage Two: Concentration Levels
In stage two of its analysis, the ACCC will focus on market structure,
in particular, whether market concentration has risen to such a level that the
merger is likely to have adverse anti-competitive consequences. The
Commission uses the traditional four firm concentration ratio ("CR4"),
which is the sum of the actual shares of the four largest firms. It states:
If the merger will result in a post-merger combined market share of the
four (or fewer) largest firms (CR4) of 75 percent or more and the merged firm
will supply at least 15 percent of the relevant market, the Commission will
want to give further consideration to a merger proposal before being satisfied
that it will not result in a substantial lessening of competition. In any event, if
the merged firm will supply 40 percent or more of the market the Commission
will want to give the merger further consideration. The twofold thresholds re-
flect concerns with the potential exercise of both coordinated market power
and unilateral market power.3 '
C. Stage Three: Import Competition
Stage three of the Commission's analysis is to consider the effect of
import competition on those mergers that pass through the concentration
screen or filter.
Economists divide goods and services into two broad categories: those
that are able to be traded internationally and those that are not. Most serv-
ices are non-tradable. Some goods are non-tradable because of their weight
and high transportation costs make their importation unprofitable. It is es-
timated that only a quarter of Australia's gross domestic product consists of
goods that are tradable. In its investigation of global mergers the Commis-
sion focuses on the non-tradable sector.
The Commission tends not to recognise the existence of world markets.
Rather, it defines the relevant geographic market to be Australia or a part of
301d. at para. 5.62.
311d. at para. 5.95.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:255 (2000)
Australia and to treat the market share of imports as indicative of their
competitive role in that market. The Merger Guidelines provide guidance
on the ACCC's assessment of import competition. If import competition is
an effective check on the exercise of market power the ACCC is unlikely to
oppose the merger.
For example, in Email/Southcorp the two major manufacturers of
whitegoods in Australia were allowed to merge because of significant im-
ports into Australia by a New Zealand manufacturer, Fisher & Paykel. The
ACCC stated:
Import Competition: The parties submitted that despite the high level of
market concentration that would result from the merger, the proposal was un-
likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition due to the existing and
potential level of import competition in each market.
The ACCC rigorously explored this issue. Factors considered in-
cluded:Market shares of imported products; (1) Range of imported products
available within each product market; (2) Price competitiveness of imported
products; (3) Ability of importers to establish adequate distribution channels
and presence in local retail outlets; (4) Ability of importers to provide adequate
"after care" service; and (5) Other factors which could impede the ability of
imported products to provide effective competition including perception of
brand loyalty and ability of local competitors to engage in strategic behaviour
to deter the growth of imports.
While recognising the increased level of concentration, the ACCC noted
that in most product markets the level of imports were significant. Imports
were found to be obtained from a variety of sources from Asia, the US,
Europe, and Turkey.
Given that the products within these markets are not homogenous prod-
ucts but include a variety of product lines which range in price as well as fea-
tures, particular attention was given to assessing whether the imports were
competitive across markets as a whole, rather than just within discrete market
segments.32
The Commission has been criticised for failing to accord sufficient
weight to the importance of import competition. According to the Industry
Commission whenever imports exceed ten percent, there should be a pre-
sumption that mergers will not substantially lessen competition.
33
The Industry Commission's recommendation of providing a "safe har-
bour" for mergers where imports exceed ten percent has, itself been criti-
cised. Professor Henry Ergas has observed:
Taken as it stands, this is an extremely curious recommendation. In ef-
fect, it amounts to proposing that a firm which has a 50% market share should
32 Email Acquisition Of Southcorp's Whitegoods Not Opposed, AuSTL. COMPETITION &
CONSUMER COMM'N MEDIA RELEASE, MR 24/99 (Mar. 11, 1999).
33See Industry Commission, MERGER REGULATION: A REVIEW OF THE DRAFT MERGER
GUIDELINES ADMINISTERED BY THE AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
para. 3.3.1 (June 1996).
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be permitted to merge with a firm with a 40% market share so long as imports
account for the remainder of the market. Thus, were such an approach
adopted, GM could merge its Australian operations with Ford, with the ACCC
not even inquiring as to the competitive effects which the merger would en-
tail.
34
D. Stage Four: Barriers to Entry
Stage four of the Commission's analysis is to consider the height of
barriers to entry, which are widely defined to include "any feature of a mar-
ket that places an efficient prospective entrant at a significant disadvantage
compared with incumbent firms.,' 3 The examples given include access to
scarce resources, economies of scale and scope, product differentiation and
brand loyalty and sunk costs.
E. Stage Five: Efficiency Claims, Market Dynamics, etc...
Stage five of the Commission's analysis is to consider a number of
other qualitative market factors that are linked in section 50(3), namely
whether the merged firm will face any countervailing market power; the
availability of substitutes; whether the merger will result in the removal of a
vigorous and effective competitor; vertical integration; the dynamic char-
acteristics of the market; and the likely impact of the merger on opportuni-
ties for firms in the market to co-ordinate their conduct; efficiencies and
prices and profit margins.3 6
One of the major unresolved issues in Australia relates to whether effi-
ciency is a relevant consideration in assessing the effect of a merger on
competition. Efficiency is not specifically mentioned in the list of matters
in section 50(3) that are relevant under the substantial lessening of compe-
tition test although section 50(3)(g) requires the dynamic characteristics of
the market to be considered. The list is inclusive not exhaustive. Effi-
ciency is a public benefit and is frequently taken into account by the ACCC
as part of its authorisation assessment. In this context as a public benefit ef-
ficiency generally refers to cost savings which can be passed on to consum-
ers in the form of lower prices. However, efficiency can also enhance the
merged entity's ability to compete against its rivals, so that it should also be
taken into account as part of the competition analysis rather than only being
considered as a trade off with competition in an authorisation context.
This line of reasoning that efficiencies strengthen the competitive pro-
cess was recognised by the Tribunal in Queensland Independent Wholesal-
34Henry Ergas, Are the A CCC's Merger Guidelines Too Strict? A Critical Review of the
Industry Commissions Information Paper on Merger Regulation, 6 COMP. & CONSUMER L. J.
171,176 (1998).35Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, at para. 5.116.36Id. at paras. 5.129 to 5.179.
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ers Ply. Ltd.37 Following its failed attempt to acquire Queensland Inde-
pendent Wholesalers Pty. Ltd. ("QIW"), Davids subsequently acquired the
South Australian Independent Grocery, Independent Holdings Ltd. This
was part of a long-term strategy under which Davids proposed to combine
all of the independent groceries in Australia to form a 'fourth force' in gro-
cery retailing to compete with the three integrated chains, Coles Myer,
Woolworths and Frandins. The next step in its 'fourth force' strategy was
to acquire Composite Buyers Ltd. In relation to this proposed acquisition
Davids sought to obtain an authorisation which was granted by the Com-
mission. QIW appealed against the grant of the authorisation to the Tribu-
nal, which held:
The 'fourth force' contention was presented to the Tribunal as though its
achievement would constitute a self evident benefit. We think the nature of
that benefit should be spelled out. We conclude that it is a benefit of real sub-
stance with the following elements:
It would strengthen the competitive process, enlarge the options
available to consumers and enhance consumer welfare.' s While the
Tribunal's analysis of efficiencies was in the context of a trade-off with
competition effects under the authorisation process, it raises the possibility
that efficiencies may need to be integrated within the substantial lessening
of competition test in a § 50 context as well.
The Courts, however, appear to be reluctant to take efficiencies into
account in their competition assessments under section 50. In Davids
Holdings Ply. Ltd. v Attorney General of the Commonwealth,39 a case in-
volving an attempt by Davids Holdings Pty. Ltd. to acquire QIW Retailers
Ltd., Drummond J. stated:
It has frequently been said that the provisions of Part IV of the Trade
Practices Act are designed to foster competition.. .but the justification for this
is that the underlying objective is to protect the interest of consumers, the as-
sumption being that competition is a means to that particular end... Provisions
such as Section 50 are not tools designed to enable the court to strike a balance
between the economic advantages that might flow from the economies of scale
and other efficiencies resulting from a particular merger, on the one hand, and
economic detriments of the merger, such as increased prices that consumers
may have to pay, on the other. The proscription contained in Section 50, in its
pre-1993 from, applies if the result of the intended merger is that the merged
firm would be in a position to dominate a particular market. It is no answer,
once that is established, to show, eg that a moderate reduction in price compe-
tition resulting from a particular merger would be greatly off-set, so far as the
general public interest in the efficient allocation of resources is concerned, by
benefits created by the merger. Any such balancing exercise is for the Trade
Practices Commission to carry out in dealing with an authorisation application
37Queensland Independent Wholesalers Pty. Ltd., 132 A.L.RL 225 (1995).381d. at 283-4.
39Davids Holdings Pty. Ltd. v Attorney General of the Commonwealth, 121 A.L.R. 241
(1994).
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under §§ 88(8) and (9) not the court that has to consider whether Section 50
bars a particular merger °
This passage highlights the fundamental problem that confronts effi-
ciency analysis as a standard of liability for the courts. While anti-
competitive risks that arise from structural conditions such as high concen-
tration and barriers to entry can be assessed with a reasonable degree of ac-
curacy, it is much more difficult to assess future efficiencies and balance
them against anti-competitive effects. This is a task which administrative
bodies such as the Commission and the Tribunal are better qualified to per-
form.
While the courts have so far been reluctant to embrace efficiency
analysis under section 50, the Commission explicitly recognised the effi-
cency analysis as a relevant consideration in its 1999 Merger Guidelines:
5.16 Increased exposure to global markets is placing pressure on domes-
tic firms to reduce cost, improve quality and service and innovate in order to
become more competitive. Mergers may be one means of achieving such effi-
ciencies. Section 50 is concerned with the lessening of competition in a mar-
ket, not with the competitiveness of individual firms. However, an acquisition
which increases the competitiveness of the merged firm may also increase (or
not substantially lessen) competition in a market. While efficiencies generally
arise as a question of public benefit, which falls for consideration under
authorisation.. .they are relevant in a § 50 context to the extent that they impact
on the level of competition in a market.
5.17 The analysis of efficiencies in a § 50 context must be integrated
within the framework of competition analysis, rather than being considered as
a trade-off with competition effects, as might be done in an authorisation con-
text.
5.171 As discussed in paragraphs 5.16-5.17, although § 50 is concerned
with the level of competition in markets and not the competitiveness of indi-
vidual firms, and while efficiencies are more generally relevant in the context
of authorisation, the extent to which any efficiency enhancing aspects of a
merger may impact on the competitiveness of markets is relevant in the context
of § 50.
5.172 Where a merger enhances the efficiency of the merged firm, for
example by achieving economies of scale or effectively combining research
and development facilities, it may have the effect of creating a new or en-
hanced competitive constraint on the unilateral conduct of other firms in the
market or it may undermine the conditions for coordinated conduct. Pecuniary
benefits, such as lower input prices due to enhanced bargaining power, may
also be relevant in a § 50 context.
401d. at 277.
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VI. RECENT GLOBAL MERGERS: CASE STUDIES
A. Global Merger Cleared: Coopers & Lybrand/Price Waterhouse
On March 13, 1998, the ACCC announced that it would not oppose the
merger between "Big Six" accounting firms Coopers & Lybrand and Price
Waterhouse since the merger was unlikely to lessen competition substan-
tially.41 The ACCC identified the following professional services as being
relevant: (1) audit and accounting services; (2) taxation advice; (3) man-
agement consultancy services; (4) corporate recovery and insolvency ad-
vice; (5) corporate financial advice; and (6) actuarial services.
The ACCC defined the geographic scope of the relevant markets to be
Australia-wide.
The question of market definition in service industries as opposed to
traded goods poses particular problems. If a multinational corporation re-
quires audit services, in a number of different countries and the merged en-
tity is able to provide those services on a world-wide basis, it could be
argued that the relevant geographic market is world-wide. However, if the
SSNIP test is applied, and the audit regulations of countries differ, a hypo-
thetical monopolist in Australia could raise prices without being constrained
by auditors in other parts of the world. This analysis assumes that each
subsidiary of a multi-national corporation is free to engage its own auditors
and that decision is not adopted on a world-wide basis. The ACCC cor-
rectly identified the geographic market, as confined to Australia.
Having identified the product and geographic dimensions of each mar-
ket the ACCC then sought to identify the market shares of the parties in
each of the six markets. The markets with the highest concentration levels
were those for tax advice and auditing and accounting services.
In relation to the provision of tax advice the merged entity would have
a post-merger market share of slightly in excess of forty percent, which ex-
ceeds the ACCC's concentration threshold. Nevertheless, the ACCC con-
cluded that a substantial lessening of competition was unlikely given the
presence of alternative suppliers of such services, namely lawyers and sec-
ond tier accounting firms.
Regarding the auditing and accounting services market the merged en-
tity would have a market share of between twenty-four and twenty-six per-
cent. The four largest accounting firms would have a post-merger
combined market share of between seventy-seven and seventy-nine percent.
This satisfied the Commission's CR4 threshold in its Merger Guidelines.
Nevertheless, the ACCC concluded that the clients of the "Big Five" firms
were well informed about the fees paid by the competing "Big Five" firms
4 1AUSTL. COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMM'N MEDIA RELEASE, MR 46/98 (1998). In
relation to this-merger the ACCC issued a comprehensive background paper setting out its
analysis and findings.
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and tendering for audit services was common place among large corporate
clients.
The countervailing power exercised by these clients would lead to in-
creased competition so that the merger was unlikely to lead to a substantial
lessening of competition in the market for auditing services in Australia.
4 2
As regards the significance of countervailing power the ACCC stated:
Market inquiries revealed that audit clients widely believed that they
could ensure a competitive price for the "Big Six" services they purchased.
This is true both in the context of an ongoing relationship with incumbent
auditors and in the context of a tender process for audit services.
Most clients were well informed buyers. They generally monitored the
fees paid by their competitors (through public annual reports and corporate re-
turns in Australia and overseas). In almost all cases, the Chief Financial Offi-
cers of the client companies who hire the "Big Six" accounting firms are
members of the accounting profession themselves, and are often ex-"Big Six."
They are well aware of price, quality and value in relation to the audit product.
Most clients have rigorous internal processes to ensure good service and
competitive pricing. These processes often have two or three stages of review.
For example, external auditors may have to agree to an indicative audit pro-
gram and costs with the client's Chief Financial Officer, and then have this re-
viewed by the company's Audit Committee and signed-off by the Board of
Directors.
There is also the ever present threat to go to tender.
This is certainly not a step that clients take lightly because of the costs in-
volved in the tendering and selection process, the time and management re-
sources taken to bring a new auditor up to speed, the statutory requirements to
notify these changes and the general discomfort involved. Put simply, switch-
ing costs are high and incumbent auditors know this.
Against this, the incumbent auditor will stand to lose a prestigious audit
client, and with it related accounting and other work which tends to flow to the
auditor in many cases. There are also significant costs for Big Five firms in re-
searching, preparing and costing a tender proposal.
The implicit threat of taking the work to tender is an important source of
power for clients. If the work is taken to tender, large and prestigious clients
can expect very competitive bids from other "Big Six" firms. As discussed
below under product bundling, low ball bids may be put in merely to secure a
large and on-going contract, especially where that client has a non-standard re-
porting date.
The ACCC found that clients are increasingly testing the market through
formal and informal tender processes to ensure value for money from their
275
42See Garry K. Goddard, ACCC Assessment of the Coopers & Lybrand and Price Wa-
terhouse Merger: Analysis of Competition in the Provision of Professional Services by Big
Six Accounting Firms, 26 AUSTL. Bus. L. REv. 402, 413 (1998).
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auditor. Some clients said that they are paying significantly less for auditing
since they tested the market.
43
The ACCC appears to have been concerned only with the likely unilat-
eral effects of the merged entity and whether the merger would lead to
higher prices in any of the markets for services identified. It does not ap-
pear to have considered whether the merger would have made tacit or ex-
plicit co-ordination more likely. Since the services in question are tailored
to meet the specific needs of each individual client, co-ordinated effects are
unlikely in such an industry. The Commission considered it unlikely that
the merger would substantially lessen competition in any of the markets
identified mainly because there would remain five vigorous competitors in
the market place and became of the substantial degree of countervailing
power exercised by clients.
B. Global Mergers Cleared Subject to Divestiture Undertakings: British
American Tobacco and Rothmans
On March 31, 1999, the ACCC announced that it would oppose the
proposed merger between British American Tobacco ("BAT") and Roth-
mans.44 BAT, a UK corporation, had a sixty-seven percent interest in the
Australian cigarette manufacturer, WD & HO Wills Holdings. Rothmans
BV., a company incorporated in The Netherlands, had a fifty percent inter-
est in the Australian cigarette manufacturer Rothmans Holdings Ltd.
The merged entity would have a 62 percent share of the Australian
cigarettes market. The ACCC examined the effect of the merger on con-
centration levels in three segments or sub-markets namely premium ciga-
rettes, main stream cigarettes and value cigarettes. It found that the merged
entity would have a 96 percent share of the premium cigarette segment;
forty-nine percent share of the main stream cigarette segment; and a 61 per-
cent share of the value cigarette segment.
The parties to the merger argued that the merged entity would not be
able to increase prices because of the potential for increased import compe-
tition. The ACCC inquiries among market participants revealed that import
competition was limited by barriers to entry, in particular, establishing retail
distribution links; brand loyalty among smokers; and restrictions on tobacco
advertising that limited opportunities to build cigarette brand images. There
was no evidence of significant planned imports of generic cigarettes by
wholesalers or retailers.
On June 3, 1999, the ACCC announced that it would not oppose the
merger following a section 87B undertaking given by the parties to divest a
43See Austl. Competition and Consumer Comm'n, A CCC Background Paper, Merger of
Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse, para. 4.5 (Aug. 31, 1999).
"British American Tobacco Plc and Rothmans International BV, 21 AusTL. COMp. &
CONSUMER CoMM'N. J. 16 (June 1999).
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number of cigarette brands to the Imperial Tobacco Group Plc. 45 The di-
vestiture resulted in the merged BAT and Rothmans having a market share
of 44 percent rather than 62 percent. Imperial Tobacco would gain a 17
percent share of the cigarette market including a brand in the premium seg-
ment of the market. The European Commission cleared the BAT/Rothmans
merger without requiring any divestiture.
4 6
The ACCC appears to have been concerned principally with the unilat-
eral effects of the proposed merger, rather than coordinated effects. In
Australia, the merger as originally proposed would have given the merged
entity a market share of 62 percent so that there was a risk that it could ex-
ercise unilateral market power. The claim by the parties that proposed
changes to certain tax arrangements would result in the merged entity fac-
ing a flood of imports was not taken seriously by the ACCC. In order to
convince the ACCC that the exercise of unilateral market power was un-
likely it was necessary for the parties to divest a 17 percent share of the
cigarette market to Imperial Tobacco. This resulted in three large competi-
tors (BAT/Rothmans, Philip Morris and Imperial Tobacco) and signifi-
cantly enhanced prospects for competition.
1. Pepsi Co/The Smith's Snack Food Company
In November 1997, the ACCC was notified by Pepsi Co. Inc. (the U.S.
parent company of Frito-Lay Australia) that it intended to acquire from
United Biscuits (Holdings) Ple a number of businesses around the world.47
These included The Smith's Snack Food Company, which was the manu-
facturer of several Australian salty snackfood icon brands such as, CCs,
Twisties, Cheezels and Smith's Original Potato Chips. The effect of the
acquisition was that the second largest Australian producer of salty snack-
foods, Frito-Lay Australia, would acquire the largest Australian producer of
salty snackfoods (The Smith's Snackfood Company).
Frito-Lay informed the ACCC that in order to avoid a substantial less-
ening of competition in any market, it would agree to divest a package of
brands.
The ACCC obtained a section 87B undertaking from Pepsi Co. that it
would complete the acquisition of The Smith's Snackfood Company only in
conjunction with a simultaneous divestiture of assets. The divestiture proc-
ess resulted in the creation of Snack Brands Australia, which acquired the
45 A CCC Accepts Cigarettes Divestiture, AUSTL. COMP. & CONSUMER COMM'N MEDIA
RELEASE, MR 83199, (June 3, 1999); British American Tobacco Pic. and Rothmans Interna-
tionalBV, 22 Ausm. COMP. & CONSUMER COMM'N. J. 43 (1999).
46BAT/Rotlmans, Case IV/M 1415, Art. 6(1)(b), Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 on
the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, as amended by
1990 O.J. (L 257) 14.
4 7 AUSTL. COMP. & CONSUMER COMM'N. MEDIA RELEASE, MR 161/98, (Aug. 21 1998).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:255 (2000)
original Frito-Lay production facilities and several key brands such as CCs
and Cheezels.
In mid-June 1998, the ACCC was informed that Frito-Lay's preferred
acquirer for Snack Brands Australia was Dollar Sweets Holdings, a manu-
facturer of food and confectionery products.
Prior to the merger Smith's had a market share of 50 percent and Frito-
Lay a market share of 29 percent with other suppliers responsible for 21
percent of the market. After the merger Frito-Lay had a market share of 48
percent and Snack Brands Australia a market share of 31 percent.
The Commission concluded that, in light of the purchase of Snack
Brands Australia by Dollar Sweets Holdings, the acquisition of The Smith's
Snackfood Company by Pepsi Co. was unlikely to result in a substantial
lessening of competition. The ACCC formed the view that the sale to Dol-
lar Sweets would result in a continuation of the vigorous competition that
occurred in the market prior to the merger. As with the BAT/Rothmans
merger, the Commission needed to be satisfied that a vigorous and effective
competitor to the merged entity would remain in the market, so that it
would not be able to exercise unilateral market power and raise prices after
the merger.
C. Global Merger: Clearance Denied
1. Coca-Cola Company/Cadbury Schweppes
It is fitting that Coca-Cola should be the subject of a global merger
since it is the quintessential global product: wherever one buys the product
in the world, it will taste the same. In December 1998, the Coca-Cola
Company announced it intended to acquire all of the Schweppes soft drinks
business worldwide, with the exception of the U.S., France and South Af-
rica. The European Commission conducted an investigation of the com-
petitive effects of the transaction under the EC Merger Regulation by
sending requests for information to competitors and customers of Coca-
Cola and Schweppes throughout Europe. The Commission received several
complaints about the effects of the proposed merger in Europe.
On May 24, 1999 Coca-Cola and Schweppes announced a restructur-
ing of their global merger to exclude all European Union Member States
with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Greece.
On Februar 16, 1999 the ACCC was advised of the Australian aspects
of the merger.4 The international brands affected by the acquisition in
Australia included "Dr. Pepper", "Canada Dry" and "Schweppes" branded
beverages, including Schweppes mixers, its carbonated soft drinks such as
4 8A CCC Opposes Revised Coke/Schweppes Acquisition, AuSTL. COMP. & CONSUMER
COMM'N. MEDIA RELEASE, MR 89/99, (Jun. 8, 1999); The Coca-Cola Company and Cad-
bury Schweppes, 21 AUSTL. COMP. & CONSUMER COMM'N. J. 15 (June 1999).
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lemonade and cola, as well as its flavoured mineral waters. In Australia the
acquisition involved the retention by Coca-Cola of these international
brands while national and regional brands, such as "Solo" and "Tarax,"
were to be divested to an undetermined third party.
The Commission identified the relevant product market as carbonated
soft drinks. It determined that fruit juice, milk and other cold beverages
were not close substitutes and that a small but significant price increase in
carbonated soft drinks did not lead to a substantial switching of purchasers
to other beverages.
As a result of the acquisition by Coca-Cola of Schweppes international
brands, Coca-Cola's market share would increase from 65 percent to 75
percent in the carbonated soft drink market. Concentration would be even
higher in the non-supermarket segment, such as the supply of carbonated
soft drinks to refrigerators in convenience stores or to hotels, clubs and
sporting venues.
Apart from increasing the level of concentration, the ACCC deter-
mined that the proposed merger would increase barriers to entry. The
merged entity would have a very powerful portfolio of established brands
covering most parts of the market (supermarkets and non-supermarket seg-
ments such as supply of carbonated soft drinks to refrigerators in conven-
ience stores and to hotels, clubs and sporting venues). Other barriers to
entry identified were Coca-Cola's extensive distribution system including
beverage vending machines and glass door refrigerators in convenience
stores.
The Commission considered that no competitor, even with the national
brands of Schweppes which Coca-Cola proposed to divest, could provide an
effective competitive constraint on the merged entity.
The acquisition of Schweppes international brands would result in the
removal of a vigorous and effective competitor to the Coca-Cola business.
The Commission considered that if the merger proceeded it was likely that
prices would rise in the carbonated soft drink market. Accordingly, the
ACCC advised the parties that the proposal to merge the international
brands of Coca-Cola and Cadbury Schweppes in Australia would be likely
to have the effect of substantially lessening competition. The merger par-
ties lodged a revised proposal in April 1999. The revised proposal did not
address the ACCC's competition concerns since the premium Schweppes
branded drinks remained a part of the transaction. On June 8, 1999, the
ACCC announced its opposition to the revised merger proposal.49
During its investigation the Commission received complaints from the
non-supermarket segments of the market about certain vertical behaviour by
Coca-Cola. The Commission is conducting a further investigation to de-
49The Coca-Cola Company and Cadbury Schweppes, 22 Ausm. COMP. & CONSUMER
COMM'N. J. 42 (1999).
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termine whether Coca-Cola has contravened other provisions of the Trade
Practices Act namely section 47 which prohibits exclusive dealing and sec-
tion 46 which prohibits taking advantage of market power.50 These com-
plaints suggest that Coca-Cola was already in a position to exercise
unilateral market power prior to the merger, despite the presence of Pepsi as
a vigorous and effective competitor.
Not only did Coca-Cola fail to acquire the international brands of
Schweppes in Australia, it attracted the close scrutiny of the ACCC and a
wide-ranging investigation into its conduct in the market place. This may
lead to court proceedings for the imposition of substantial pecuniary penal-
ties for breaches of the rules prohibiting exclusive dealing and misuse of
market power.
D. Global Joint Venture: Authorisation Granted
Global mergers and joint ventures which have an anti-competitive ef-
fect in Australia could give rise to a public benefit. In such a case it is nec-
essary to apply to the ACCC for authorisation. The Commission's analysis
of horizontal joint ventures tends to follow its analysis of horizontal merg-
ers. The ACCC has considered two global alliances in relation to the mar-
ket for airline services. These alliances covered both passenger and cargo
transportation services with respect to round-trip flights on routes between
various Australian capital cities and other destinations in Europe. They in-
volve joint price setting by the parties. Horizontal price fixing is prohibited
absolutely in Australia. It is deemed to substantially lessen the competition.
There is, however, an exception to the deeming provision in relation to joint
venture pricing. Joint venture pricing will only be prohibited if, in fact, it
has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competi-
tion.
In relation to market definition a preliminary issue was whether the
passenger and cargo transport market should be defined by region or by
route and whether they should be defined by customer type. In Qan-
tas/British Airways" and Air Alliance52 the Commission concluded that the
relevant air passenger and cargo transport market should be defined by re-
gion. It concluded that there was a separate market for air passenger travel
between Australia and Europe including all passenger types and all classes
5 It appears that conduct involving "partnership discounts" tied not to objective criteria
such as increases in sales but to excluding Pepsi from restaurants and hotels is also being
practised in Europe. See Goingfor Coke, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 51. In Decem-
ber 1999, the Italian competition regulator fined Coca-Cola-Italian US$16.1 million and
prohibited it from offering "partnership discounts" awarded to wholesalers in exchange for
pledges not to sell Pepsi. See Sue Mitchell, Italian Ruling No Better for Coke, THE AUSTL.
FIN. REv., Dec. 22, 1999, at 19.51A.T.P.R. (CCH) 50-184 (1995).52A.T.P.R. (CCH) 50-265 (1998).
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of travel and a separate cargo transport market between Australia and
Europe. This broad market definition is at odds with the ACCC's tendency
to define markets narrowly in merger cases (e.g. carbonated soft drinks,
premium cigarettes and salty snack foods).
Regarding the market for passengers, the Commission took the view
that given the existence of a dense network of connecting flights within
Europe, most flights from Australia to Europe would be substitutes for the
most direct flight paths between city pairs. Accordingly, the relevant geo-
graphic market should be the terminating region. It is arguable that busi-
ness travelers booking for a direct flight between Sydney and London do
not regard an indirect flight to another European hub as an effective substi-
tute. The elasticity of demand for business passengers is likely to be ine-
lastic.
By way of contrast the European Commission in its analysis of the
Lufthansa/SAS co-operative agreement of 1998, the Official Journal of the
European Communities identified the relevant markets as several city pairs
between Scandinavia and Germany.53
In order to obtain an authorisation it is necessary to convince the
ACCC that the merger or joint venture will give rise to public benefits
which outweigh any anti-competitive detriment. This is similar to the
analysis conducted by the European Commission pursuant to article 85(3)
of the Treaty of Rome. The public benefits claimed in the Air Alliance
authorisation were: (1) increased competition; (2) a stronger international
and domestic airline; (3) more efficient use of resources; (4) improved con-
sumer service (e.g. larger network, integration of information systems, new
products, seamless travel, expanded frequent flyer scheme); (5) increased
tourism; and (6) facilitation of trade and enhanced employment opportuni-
ties.
The Commission accepted some of the public benefits but not others.
It concluded that public benefits would arise from increased competition, a
stronger Ansett International, new products, more efficient use of resources,
the facilitation of seamless services and enhanced frequent flyer programs.
The ACCC was unable to conclude that the claimed public benefits associ-
ated with employment, trade and tourism would eventuate. However, it
authorised the alliance agreement for a period of five years.
VII. GLOBAL MERGERS - A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
There are now a significant number of jurisdictions with merger filing
and merger review procedures in place. Rowley and Campbell state that
53See 1998 O.J. (L 54) 28. See also Crocioni, The Lufihansa/SAS Case: Did the Com-
mission Get the Economics Right? ECLR 116 (1998).
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over 50 countries have enacted merger regimes and that more are under
consideration.54
Multiple reviews by different regulators in different jurisdictions ap-
plying different merger review standards can significantly increase transac-
tion costs and may lead to different conclusions about the likely anti-
competitive effect of a merger.
Rowley and Baker 5 have identified three categories into which most
merger review systems fall: Market Dominance Regimes, which provide
that a merger, which enables a leading firm to achieve or strengthen a
dominant position in a market may be prohibited (e.g. European Union and
New Zealand). Substantial Lessening of Competition Regimes, which seek
to prevent mergers that are likely to tighten coordinated conduct in a market
or provide a single firm with market power (e.g. U.S., Canada, Australia).
Public Interest Regimes, which consider not only the effect on competition
of a proposed transaction, but such other public benefits such as employ-
ment, export promotion and international comparative advantage (e.g.
United Kingdom, France, Spain).
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger illustrates the problem. The
Federal Trade Commission in the United States decided on July 1, 1997 that
it would not raise any antitrust objection to the acquisition. In a joint
statement, four commissioners expressed the view that in the commercial
aircraft sector McDonnell Douglas was no longer a meaningful competitive
force. While it could not be said to be a failing company, there was no
prospect of significant commercial sales and accordingly it could no longer
be regarded as an effective competitor.
Boeing had entered into twenty-year exclusive contracts with three
major airlines, American Airlines, Delta Airlines and Continental Airlines,
to purchase only Boeing planes. The four commissioners in their statement
expressed the view that these contracts were potentially troubling. Boeing
was the largest player in the global commercial aircraft market and the con-
tracts. foreclosed about eleven percent of that market. The four commis-
sioners stated that they would monitor the potential anti-competitive effects
of these and any future long-term exclusive contracts.
54J. William Rowley QC & A. Neil Campbell, Multi-jurisdictional Merger Review - Is It
Time for a Common Form Filing Treaty? in POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REV.,
9, 10. See also Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, MERGER CASES
IN THE REAL WORLD - A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PRACTICES (1994) (noting that the
Gillette/Wilkinson Sword acquisition was notified in 14 jurisdictions); Joseph P. Griffin, An-
titrust Aspects of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 19 EuR. CoMP. L. REv. 12 (1998).
55See INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 4, (Rowley and Baker eds.,
Sweet & Maxwell, London 1996).
56 See FTC Won't Ground Consolidation of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, 73
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 4 (BNA) (1997).
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On March 19, 1997, the European Commission announced that it had
"serious doubts" about the transaction even though neither Boeing nor
McDonnell Douglas had any facilities or assets in the EU. The U.S. viewed
the European Commission's stance as a protectionist measure since the
merger would adversely affect the ability of the sole remaining European
manufacturer, Airbus Industrie, to compete.
After an intensive five-month investigation the European Commission
concluded:
Boeing.. .already had a dominant position in the world-wide market for
large commercial jet aircraft. Boeing's existing dominance stems from its very
high market share (64% world-wide), the size of its fleet in service (60%
world-wide), and the fact that it is the only manufacture that offers a complete
family of aircraft. This position cannot be challenged by potential new en-
trants, given the extremely high barriers to entry in this hugely capital intensive
market. Boeing's dominance is further demonstrated by the recent conclusion
of long-term exclusive supply deals with three of the worlds leading carriers,
American, Delta and Continental Airlines who would have been unlikely to
lock themselves into 20-year agreements with a supplier who did not already
dominate, and seem likely to continue to dominate, the large jet aircraft mar-
ket.
57
The Commission gave its approval subject to Boeing giving undertaking to
refrain from entering into exclusive supply agreements until 2007, and not
to enforce to the exclusivity rights in existing contracts.58
It is generally acknowledged that the harmonisation of substantive
merger rules is not likely in the foreseeable future. This is not surprising
given the widely differing stages of economic development and economic
policies that prevail. Some countries in Asia, such as Indonesia and South
Korea, are promoting foreign investment at any cost and have no or weak
competition laws. Some countries, such as the U.S., Australia and New
Zealand, have court-centered competition law regimes. Others, such as the
EU, are regulated primarily by an administrative agency.
The obstacles to harmonization are not just technical or legal; they are
embedded in broader cultural, social and political differences among coun-
tries. Countries do not trust each other; as globalisation gathers pace each
country feels it must do what it can to protect its national interests. What
happens when national interests collide? If there is a down turn in the
global economy, protectionist measures emerge. While there may be a
broad consensus about which mergers are likely to lessen competition sub-
57See 5 CMLR ANTITRUST SUPPLEMENT 253 (1997).
58For an analysis of the issues raised by extraterritoriality and merger regulation, see J.D.
Banks, The Development of the Concept of Extraterritoriality under European Merger Law
and Its Effectiveness Under the Merger Regulation Following the Boeing/McDonnell Doug-
las Decision 1997, 19 EuR. CoMp. L. REv. 306 (1998); Andre R. Fiebig, International Law
Limits on the Extraterritorial Application of the European Merger Control Regulation and
Suggestions for Reform, 19 EuR. CoM. L. REv. 323 (1998).
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stantially, there is no general agreement about whether mergers should be
authorizsed or approved in the public interest. Some countries will be con-
cerned about the employment consequences of a merger.
Some degree of harmonisation may be possible in relation to proce-
dures for review by the adoption of a multilateral treaty, which would pro-
vide for common timing rules, filing forms and information sharing
arrangements, but leave the domestic enforcement bodies to make assess-
ments. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") Committee on Competition Law and Policy has adopted a com-
mon filing form, but the form has not yet been endorsed by the OECD
Council, and Member States may not adopt it. The World Trade Organisa-
tion ("WTO") had met in Seattle last November. The EU, Japan and Korea
argue that the ambit of the talks should include the development of global
rules on investment and competition policy.5 9 However, the WTO is pri-
marily a trade organisation and is probably not the appropriate forum for
assessing the competition effects of global mergers.
Other forms of information sharing between regulators and co-
operation are likely. On June 4, 1998, the U.S. and EU signed an agree-
ment clarifying the circumstances under which they will refer cases in-
volving anti-competitive conduct to each other under the doctrine of
"positive comity".60 The U.S. and EU have agreed that some circumstances
will justify parallel investigations. While neither side waives its authority
to institute its own enforcement actions, each side will normally defer or
suspend enforcement activities aimed at anticompetitive conduct which oc-
curs in the other's territory in favour of a positive comity referral to the
other party. The new agreement does not at present apply to mergers be-
cause of the strict statutory deadlines of U.S. and EU merger review regula-
tion. A system of suspension or deferral of investigations may, however, be
the only way to deal with the problem of over-regulation of global mergers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Australia's recent experience of global mergers suggests that the
ACCC will scrutinise carefully their effect on domestic competition in
Australia. The ACCC has discretion whether to challenge a global merger
in the courts. Its administrative decision making is generally well-reasoned
and based on a large amount of factual information. Unlike the European
Commission, which publishes quite lengthy reasons when opposing or
59Brendan Pearson, Heavies in Conflict over WTO Negotiations, THE AUSTL. FIN. REV.,
Aug. 16, 1999, at 6. For a consideration of the WTO as a possible forum for multilateral an-
titrust cooperation, see Claudio Cocuzza and Massimiliano Montini, International Antitrust
Co-operation in a GlobalEconomy, 19 EuR. Comp. L. REv. 156, 160-63 (1998).
60See U.S. and European Union Sign Antitrust Cooperation Agreement, 74 ANrTRusT &
TRADE REG. REP. 587 (BNA) (1998); Council and Commission Decision 98/386/EC, ECSC,
1998 O.J. (L 173) 26.
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blocking a proposed merger, the ACCC rarely publishes its detailed rea-
sons. It relies instead on a one page press release which merely summarises
its conclusion. This lack of transparency may give the impression that it
acts arbitrarily.
61
If the Commission forms the view that the proposed acquisition is un-
likely to substantially lessen competition the parties can proceed. The Coo-
pers & LybrandiPrice Waterhouse merger illustrates such an outcome.
Another possibility is that the acquirer will be required to divest assets pur-
suant to a § 87B undertaking as the "price" for allowing the merger to pro-
ceed. Divestitures occurred in relation to the BAT/Rothmans merger and
the Pepsi Co/Smith's Snack Food merger.
If the parties to a proposed merger cannot convince the ACCC that it is
unlikely to substantially lessen competition, or cannot restructure and divest
to the ACCC's satisfaction, they have no choice but to apply to the ACCC
for an authorisation. Such authorisation was granted for the British Air-
ways/QANTAS air alliance.
Those contemplating a global merger should not underestimate the
thoroughness of the ACCC's merger investigations. The Coca-
Cola/Cadbury Schweppes merger illustrates that the ACCC is prepared to
block the Australian component of a global merger.
On April 27, 1999 the Australian government and the United States
government signed an agreement on mutual antitrust enforcement assis-
tance. It is likely that the enforcement authorities in each jurisdiction will
assist each other in investigating the competition effects of a global merger.
Accordingly, the parties need to consider in advance whether to waive their
rights to confidentiality in order to expedite the clearance process.
In the Coopers & Lybrand/Price Waterhouse merger the parties
waived their rights to confidentiality and this allowed for an exchange of
submissions made to competition regulators in Australia, the U.S., the EU
and Canada.
However, the problems raised by global mergers give rise to multiple
notifications, review by multiple enforcement authorities, the collection of
information outside national boundaries; thus, merger standards and reme-
dies are likely to remain inconsistent for the foreseeable future.
61 The ACCC is not alone in this regard. See Rowley & Campbell, supra note 54, at 29.
Rowley and Campbell conclude in their comparative study that "with the notable exception
of the European Union, the level of transparency for decisions on specific transactions is
modest to abysmal." Id.
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